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Abstract
The article provides a critical overview of the latest phase of scholarly 
engagement with Eurocommunism, firstly, by pointing out the resilience 
of a ‘Cold War framing’ in many of the new studies of the phenom-
enon, secondly, by stressing the resulting blind spots in the assessment 
of its geographical scope (e.g., the lack of attention paid to Spain, scarce 
contributions on Eurocommunism’s ramifications beyond West Europe). 
It then proposes a de-centred perspective on the phenomenon that is 
able to encompass its global roots and outreach, especially regarding the 
Third World; contrary to the prevalent focus on individual national cases 
of Eurocommunism, the article calls for a framing of Eurocommunist 
coordination as a transnational formation, so that both the leading role 
of Italian communists and the cross-border exchanges that shaped it 
can factor into a revised scholarly engagement with the topic. From this 
vantage point, Eurocommunism emerges as a strategy of transition for 
the global conjuncture of multiple crises that the 1970s represented, one 
that nevertheless failed to present a viable alternative to neoliberalism, 
another product of the decade in question. The article concludes by 
approaching the little explored gender dimension of Eurocommunism, 
visible in its entanglement with the second-wave feminism.
Keywords Eurocommunism; Cold War framing; 1970s crisis; Third 
World; feminism; neoliberalism
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Introduction 
Eurocommunism figures in the scholarship as a significant, if short-lived, phenomenon of 1970s West Europe: an outlier to bipolar logic unwittingly fostered by the brief respite in superpower rivalry 
known as ‘détente’. It consisted in the coordinated attempt by major 
West European communist parties (CPs) to become credible alternatives 
of government, shedding the political outsider status ascribed to them 
within the prevailing Cold War framework. The formula employed to 
this end by its proponents – mainly the Italian, French and Spanish CPs 
[henceforth PCI, PCF, PCE] – placed democracy and pluralism at the 
centre of a reformed communist politics that distanced itself from the 
Soviet model yet still professed the aim of socialist transformation. As 
such, Eurocommunism aimed to constitute a ‘third way’ overcoming 
‘both the orthodox communist and the social democratic traditions’1 in 
the ‘context of the West’.2 
In his noted Moscow speech of November 1977, Enrico Berlinguer 
concisely stated the key components of the Eurocommunist formula – 
and why it was an all-round geopolitical nuisance factor: 
Experience has led us to the conclusion, as has been the case of 
other communist parties of capitalist Europe, that democracy is 
today not only the terrain upon which the class enemy is forced to 
retreat, but also the historically universal value upon which a novel 
socialist society is to be founded.3 
By leveraging democracy as both a means of transition to socialism 
and as the political form of a fully constituted socialist reality, 
Eurocommunists did not so much mediate between the Cold War 
poles of capitalism and socialism as embody a critique of their foremost 
‘actually existing’ representatives. The socialist society Berlinguer 
envisioned was novel due to its democratic constitution – i.e., it was 
imagined in contrast to extant models; but it was equally supposed to 
transcend present-day democracies, which still lodged the capitalist 
‘class enemy’ in their entrails. 
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If the Cold War was ‘not solely a story of power dynamics’, as recent 
scholarship has emphasised, but also ‘a clash of ideologies, a battle for 
the future political and economic development of humanity’, what 
distinguished the Eurocommunist proposition was its ostensible critique 
of the democratic shortcomings weighing on either side, i.e., the lack of 
political freedoms behind the ‘iron curtain’ and the social and global 
inequalities that plagued the ‘free world’.4 This stance, which emanated 
from actors operating both within the ‘West’ and the international 
communist movement, held the potential to inspire a wide variety 
of actors in opposition to the bipolar status quo. Indeed, the appeal 
of Eurocommunism was inseparable from its framing of democracy; 
positing democracy as a ‘universal value’, gave it (potentially) ‘universal 
appeal’, at least in the sense of drawing adherents across Cold War 
divides during a time – the 1970s – marked by important realignments 
in the international order.5
Eurocommunism’s momentum was, however, not only a function of 
its status as an undesired consequence of détente or simply of its propo-
nents’ desire to bypass the ground rules for politics in the bipolar world. 
It had a range of domestic ramifications and its advent also marked the 
last peak of prestige and/or electoral success for the three major West 
European CPs. The PCF was up to the mid-1970s the main force of the 
left in France, consistently reaching around 20 per cent of the vote; its 
alliance with socialists, the ‘Union of the left’, almost elected François 
Mitterrand president in 1974;6 the PCI, which had attempted an alli-
ance with Christian Democrats through the ‘historic compromise’ in 
1973, reached over 34 per cent of the vote in 1976.7 The PCE, in turn, 
had established itself as the main resistance organisation to the Franco 
dictatorship8 and, after abandoning armed struggle in the 1950s, 
became the key cog in the broad alliance that would spur Spain’s transi-
tion to democracy in the mid-1970s.9 This renewed relevance in their 
respective national landscapes helped prop up Eurocommunism on the 
international stage for a time.
Faced with sudden decline in the early 1980s, the same parties 
dragged the Eurocommunist formula down with them. Crucially, ‘it 
was not the collapse of the communist parties in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union’, as Charles S. Maier has stressed, ‘that undermined 
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the communist parties in the West’. A wider phenomenon was at play, 
namely, ‘a more general loss of collectivist or leftist vision, East and 
West, during the 1970s and 1980s’.10 A key contextual element for this 
shift is the global economic downturn that marked the period and the 
cycle of transitions and adjustments that it heralded.11 Eurocommunism 
was an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reshape the political arena 
in response to this crisis scenario, much like the contemporary Third 
World uprisings and global feminist wave were attempts at radically 
reshaping centre-periphery and gender relations in its wake. As this 
essay will indicate, these trends not only inhabited the same world, they 
were interconnected. This wider embeddedness of Eurocommunism 
has, nevertheless, not been reflected in the research and my main goal 
in this critical review of the literature is to raise a few hypotheses as to 
why that has been the case.
Eurocommunism has been an object of research practically from the 
moment of its emergence. At its peak in the 1970s, Eurocommunism’s 
combination of transversal repercussion in the global arena and imme-
diate relevance at the national level quickly made it the subject of an 
abundant yet now mostly dated response from scholarship.12 The short 
lifespan of the phenomenon meant, however, that, despite the relative 
haste in the academic efforts to interpret it, much of the early literature 
surfaced as a key component of Eurocommunism – its transnational 
character – was no longer in play; by the end of the 1970s, the coordina-
tion between the main West European CPs had already broken down. 
The 1980s brought diminishing electoral results and the onset of decline 
(PCI, PCF) or terminal crisis (PCE) of the main parties involved, coin-
ciding with a predictable drop in scholarly interest on Eurocommunism. 
Its three main organisations followed distinct pathways of decline/
transformation. The PCE imploded by the early 1980s, going from 
‘hegemony to self-destruction’ in less than three decades.13 The PCI 
took the pathway of outright social democratisation and rejection of its 
communist legacy, symbolised by a name change in 1991.14 The PCF, 
in turn, represents ‘stasis’ or a slow – though not always linear – decline, 
the product of societal shifts and overly timid efforts to adapt to them 
on its part, rather than of an ineluctable fate.15 All three cases have in 
common a precipitous fall in relevance and popularity. The late 1980s 
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saw attempts at a more systematic appraisal of Eurocommunism that are 
still worth consulting,16 but the fall of the Soviet Union and the subse-
quent trajectory of what remained of the erstwhile Eurocommunist CPs 
(or their successor organisations) seemed to render moot the questions 
the phenomenon had raised. Significantly for this article, the retrospec-
tive projection of the post-1989 fate of these parties in interpretations of 
Eurocommunism – and the associated peril of a teleological analysis – 
has loomed large over scholarship on the phenomenon since the 1990s.
By the middle of this decade, the ‘third way’ between Soviet-
style socialism and West European social democracy had become a 
no man’s land. In fact, the term had since been appropriated by an 
entirely different political project, with which it is still associated, as 
large swathes of the left in the northern hemisphere attempted to work 
within the framework of neoliberalism by giving it a ‘human face’. 
Symptomatically, an almost uninterrupted silence on Eurocommunism 
prevailed in the scholarship throughout the 1990s and up to the mid-
2000s, when a strong uptick in interest reversed this trend. 17 
This article aims to provide an overview of the latest phase of schol-
arly engagement with Eurocommunism, firstly, by pointing out the 
resilience of a ‘Cold War framing’ in many of the new studies of the 
phenomenon, secondly, by stressing the resulting distortions and blind 
spots in the assessment of its geographical scope. I then suggest a few 
pathways towards a new definition of Eurocommunism that, through a 
decentred perspective, considers its global roots and outreach, especially 
regarding the Third World. From this vantage point, Eurocommunism 
emerges as a strategy of transition for the global conjuncture of multiple 
crises that the 1970s represented. The issue of Eurocommunism’s 
broadened stance on the revolutionary subject brings me, finally, to 
the little explored gender dimension of the phenomenon, visible in its 
entanglement with second-wave feminism. Based on the hypotheses 
raised in the last point, I will make the case for a new understanding of 
Eurocommunism as a key event of the world-making 1970s. 
My goal with this intervention is not only to report on the current 
state of the research on Eurocommunism, but to open a discussion 
that transcends the framing of the phenomenon within national 
historiographies and prevalent patterns in communist history. My 
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purpose is, therefore, to inquire just how much our current grasp of 
Eurocommunism can gain new contours when its global scope as well 
as broader societal implications become a part of the picture. I believe 
the latest round of studies is substantial enough that a synthesis of the 
main trends (and gaps) that have emerged can be worthwhile. In a 
development consistent with its transnational scope, Eurocommunism 
has given rise to a body of literature spread across a range of scholarly 
landscapes. With this paper I thus also hope to contribute to a more 
unified conversation on the topic considering that, despite a relevant 
amount of publications in English, much of the historical literature has 
been produced in the former ‘core’ Eurocommunist countries of Italy, 
France and Spain – each with a peculiar slant connected to the legacy of 
the respective CP – followed by the German-speaking world and Latin 
America (especially Brazil and Mexico). 
While the article stresses a few significant gaps in the scholarship, 
it does not compile an exhaustive list of research desiderata, which I 
believe only a collective effort can provide. The blind spots I highlight 
are, in turn, those specifically tied to deficits in the overall framing of 
Eurocommunism, above all, to how it is set against the background of 
the Cold War in the 1970s.
The resilience of the ‘Cold War lens’
The reclamation of Eurocommunism as an object of research was 
fostered by the 1970s coming into view of historians, who were quick to 
point out the decade’s central role in shaping the present world.18Within 
this crucial juncture, Eurocommunism’s failure has been framed as 
proof of the resilience of the bipolar system it had called into question 
and of the ‘narrow political space for unorthodox movements, especially 
in the communist camp’.19 This interpretation has been substanti-
ated by detailed reconstructions of how the great powers, especially 
in the West,20 sought to contain the Eurocommunist ‘threat’21 and 
how, despite eliciting sympathetic views from actors as diverse as GDR 
authorities22 and sectors of West European social democracy, Cold War 
loyalties ultimately prevailed.23 For, neither Soviet authorities desired 
20th Century Communism 17.indd   31 05/11/2019   15:17:42
Twentieth Century Communism – Issue 17
32 Victor Strazzeri
the formation of an autonomous European pole within the international 
communist movement, nor did US leadership consider it acceptable that 
mass communist parties should come to power in Western Europe.24 
Not surprisingly, this geopolitical constraint is understood to have 
largely sealed the fate of Eurocommunism. Indeed, the fact that the 
phenomenon occurred within the strategic theatre of Western Europe 
as well as within the political orbit of the Soviet Union not only did 
not open up a ‘third way’ for it, but made it especially vulnerable to the 
gravitational pull of the superpowers. 
The key question for historical interpretation remains, however, to 
what degree  the monumental cosmos of the bipolar world dictated the 
horizon of political life during the Cold War. While actors could not 
afford to ignore the existence of the bipolar international system, were 
they bound to appropriate the coordinates provided by this massive 
framework when seeking orientation for their political engagement? 
These questions translate, in turn, to a significant methodological 
dilemma, namely, if Cold War historians should take their bearings 
from an analytical compass structured along a dynamic of competing 
poles or whether it is possible to spatialise the period and the trajectory 
of its actors through non-binary frameworks.
The meticulously researched work of Nikolas Dörr on how U.S 
and West German authorities confronted Eurocommunism provides 
a fruitful example of how historians have sought to address these 
issues in the latest round of research on the topic. On the level of great 
power dynamics during the Cold War, the work is very illuminating. 
As a basis for a broader appraisal of the phenomenon, however, Dörr’s 
vantage point shows clear limitations. ‘In retrospect’, suggests Dörr in 
the book’s conclusion: ‘the question arises as to what was the reason for 
the political and social mass interest that Italian Eurocommunism gave 
rise to from the mid to late 1970s’. The only major clue Dörr’s investi-
gation yields in this regard is establishing that there was palpable fear 
that Eurocommunism could become a ‘valid strategy for all commu-
nist parties to come to power in Western states’. On this basis, Dörr 
concludes that ‘[p]recisely because it was often perceived as a security 
threat did Italian Eurocommunism raise so much attention’.25 Dörr’s 
‘top-down’ framing of Eurocommunism is a clear reflection of the 
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standpoint of the high-ranking ‘foreign and security policy actors’ from 
the US, West Germany and NATO prevalent in his source-material26 
– SPD records and those of the PCI play a more peripheral role in the 
study. While these are valid and revealing sources, a problem arises when 
their specific framing of Eurocommunism – i.e., as a ‘security threat’27 – 
not only shapes the analytical approach but is projected onto the wealth 
of actors behind the ‘mass interest’ on the phenomenon. It is as if super-
power competition structured the perception of political life within civil 
society at large in the same manner it did within the exclusive club of 
operators of great power politics and its dedicated observers in academia 
and the media at the time. 
Dörr’s study is but one (and indeed one of the better examples) of 
a series of research efforts to have heavily emphasised the response 
to Eurocommunism ‘from above’ – that is, from state actors, NATO 
etc. The resulting imbalance has meant that the standpoint of 
Eurocommunism’s proponents themselves and the reception of their 
propositions ‘from below’, i.e., by rank-and-file communists and within 
social movements, have scarcely been addressed in the scholarship.28 I 
attribute this to a stubborn resilience of the ‘Cold War lens’, which still 
refracts the interpretation of Eurocommunism and explains a range of 
distortions and blind spots in recent studies.29 This is particularly visible 
in how the geography of Eurocommunism has been drawn as of late. 
The spatial turn in historical scholarship notwithstanding, the latest 
round of research shows a general lack of reflection on this dimension 
of the phenomenon.
The geography of Eurocommunism: from the ‘West’ as marker to 
‘Eurocommunist space’ 
The question of just what is encompassed by the ‘euro’ in Eurocommunism 
represents an important analytical hurdle as the phenomenon was 
received and/or independently enacted beyond Europe from the very 
start. Accordingly, the early scholarship took the ‘euro’ to be relative 
and drew the scope of its outreach as far as the reform-oriented CPs 
of Japan and Australia.30 Some analysts even encompassed the cases of 
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Mexico31 and Venezuela,32 i.e., did not circumscribe Eurocommunism 
to the ‘first world’. 
If those efforts were very preliminary (a reformist impetus and will-
ingness to engage with democratic politics was enough to ascribe CPs 
to Eurocommunism), there have been practically no further attempts to 
reconstruct the global outreach of the phenomenon. The latest scholar-
ship, as Dörr has stressed, lacks ‘publications on the transcontinental 
impact of Eurocommunism’.33 Indeed, recent transnational approaches 
have conceptualised Eurocommunism as having merely a trans-Euro-
pean footprint and, at most, transatlantic relevance, considering US 
authorities’ steps to thwart the phenomenon.
I believe this narrowing of the spatial scope of Eurocommunism in 
current scholarship can be traced back to a tendency to closely embed 
the European space into the Cold War category of the ‘West’. Indeed, 
the perception of the ‘West’ as a coherent, detached bloc, operating 
under a different logic than the rest of the world seems more ingrained 
in Eurocommunism’s interpreters of today than in its observers from the 
1970s. Symptomatically, it is the same Dörr that states: 
…adding parties from ‘Third World’ states to Eurocommunism 
should generally be avoided, as they were not active within a 
Western environment and, therefore, lacked a primary defining 
characteristic of a Eurocommunist party.34
Dörr’s statement comes as a surprise considering his own call for more 
studies on Eurocommunism’s global impact. In their absence, how can 
a reliable basis for comparison between a ‘European Eurocommunism’ 
and its Third-World offshoots be consistently formulated? More telling, 
however, is the fact that Dörr makes this statement without providing 
any working definition of ‘Western environment’, which is taken as 
an unproblematic and readily understandable marker. As a result, the 
‘West’, much as it was understood during the Cold War itself, not 
only silently provides the coordinates used to draw the geo graphy of 
Eurocommunism, but more problematically, for how it is defined in 
the first place (Eurocommunism = communist politics for a ‘Western 
environment’).
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Understood as a political project and set of geopolitical alliances and 
not as a region on a map, the ‘West’ was indeed a key reality on the 
h istorical landscape of Eurocommunism. Just as thwarting the PCI’s 
ascent to power in 1948 was one of the CIA’s first tasks,35 the first ever 
meeting of the G7 in June 1976 had the ongoing economic crisis in 
Italy and the growth of the PCI at the top of its agenda. As Basosi and 
Bernardini have shown, not only did the great powers under renewed 
US hegemony, foreshadow the roll-back of Keynesian economic policy 
in West Europe during the summit (specifically in the liberalising 
conditions attached to the IMF loan to Italy), they also made ‘commu-
nist non-accession to the Italian government’ a ‘basic precondition for 
providing the financial aid’.36 Eurocommunism, thus, emerged at a 
time when the ‘West’ as a transnational field of economic and political 
relations was being profoundly reconfigured. This new scenario was not 
simply unfavourable for the coordinated West European CPs; it was 
shaped by the great powers in direct opposition to the Eurocommunist 
programme and project of power. 
Yet, it is not only the fact that the ‘Western environment’ was moving 
in a direction hostile to Eurocommunism that makes its identification 
with the ‘West’ vague and imprecise. If understood as a geographic 
manifestation of the advanced capitalist economies (the ‘core’ of global 
capitalism), which, on the basis of a Fordist arrangement, established 
welfare policies of various kinds, then the ‘West’ was not equivalent – or, 
to be more precise, isomorphic – with the scope of Eurocommunism. 
It was not a relevant phenomenon everywhere in the ‘West’. Rather, it 
only gained traction where reform-oriented CPs had a mass base and 
drew legitimacy from antifascism and from the decisive participation 
in the postwar reconstruction of democracy (or, in the case of Spain, in 
spearheading the opposition to a long-standing dictatorship). As Ralf 
Hoffrogge has pointed out, in West Germany – where ‘Western’ condi-
tions were no doubt present – the ‘renaissance of leftist politics did not 
take place through a mass Communist Party, rather it brought about new 
political formations’.37 ‘Definition by location’ proves inconclusive even 
with the added layer of specification that the three main Eurocommunist 
CPs were in Southern Europe or the Mediterranean space; as it happens, 
two of Eurocommunists’ fiercest opponents within the communist 
20th Century Communism 17.indd   35 05/11/2019   15:17:43
Twentieth Century Communism – Issue 17
36 Victor Strazzeri
movement were precisely the Portuguese and Greek CPs.38 The stance 
towards the Portuguese revolution was, in fact, an important point of 
contention between the PCI and PCF.39 Yet, the most significant issue 
with the conflation of Eurocommunism and a ‘Western’ context relates 
to the case of Spain. The dictatorship in the Iberian Peninsula was no 
doubt part of the geopolitical ‘West’, yet Franco’s Spain neither boasted 
a fully-fledged advanced capitalist economy on a Fordist basis nor, 
evidently, was it a Welfare state democracy in the mid-1970s. The PCE’s 
decided Eurocommunist turn took place while the party was still illegal, 
a status that lasted until April 1977; adhering to Eurocommunism was, 
in fact, part of its strategy to become a legitimate actor in the country’s 
protracted transition to democracy.40
The conventional definition of Eurocommunism as a communist 
politics for advanced industrial democracies likely accounts for why most 
recent studies on the topic – in addition to the obligatory Italian refer-
ence –  focus on French communists,41 widely recognised as reluctant 
adherents,42 yet omit the Spanish and wider global reception altogether. 
As E. Treglia has stressed, French and Spanish communists were almost 
permanently (and publicly) at odds after 1968, with the PCE striving for 
ever greater autonomy from the CPSU, and the PCF reverting to close 
alignment as early as 1969. This is also the context for the PCI’s replace-
ment of the PCF as the Spanish CP’s closest ally in West Europe.43 In an 
example of how ingrained centre-periphery notions can eschew analysis 
even within a purely West European framing of Eurocommunism, only 
those scholars publishing in Spanish have given enough attention to the 
key role of the PCE and the fate of the Spanish transition for the phenom-
enon as a whole.44 As an adequate appraisal of the Spanish case demands 
a reworking of the commonly held definition of Eurocommunism, it 
represents one of the keys to a renewed understanding of the phenom-
enon. In other terms, because incorporating the Spanish reception into 
the trajectory of Eurocommunism necessarily negates the phenomenon’s 
juxtaposition to an unreflected ‘Western environment’, it also opens 
up the door to an inquiry into its global roots and outreach (which 
scholars working on the PCE have, alas, also not attempted). Spanish 
communists turned to Eurocommunism for many of the same reasons 
Brazilian communists did; as both the PCE and the PCB aimed to build 
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a broad oppositional front to dictatorial regimes, the  Eurocommunist 
formula made it possible to frame the fight for democracy as coetaneous 
with the fight for socialism within a sole gradual process of transition. 
A ‘Eurocentric’ approach to Eurocommunism that places the Spanish 
and Brazilian experiences (a priori) on different spatial planes, has so far 
prevented historians engaging with such convergences.
In this sense, the problem with utilising essentialised spatial markers 
– like the Cold War notion of the ‘West’ – is that, in projecting political, 
economic and other social relations into a dead space, they also freeze 
them in time; they are thus more an obstacle than a viable pathway 
to demarcate the contours of a historical phenomenon. In this sense, 
it is Eurocommunism that can help historicise the ‘West’, and not the 
other way around. The existence of this phenomenon and its brief, but 
spectacular rise indicates that the role of West Europe in the bipolar 
framework was a contested one, especially in the period of global crises 
and realignments that the 1970s represented. What was at stake in the 
West Europe of those years was not just the drive towards integration, 
but also the region’s position within the East-West axis and, not least, 
with regard to the Third World. The peculiar role played by reform-
minded CPs in this context cannot, therefore, be approached with 
reference to the dynamic of Europe alone. 
Ultimately, by forging relationships and networks that prompted an 
array of cross-border transfers within and beyond the European setting 
and the bipolar order, Eurocommunists built a space, instead of simply 
being the product of one. The expanses of ‘Eurocommunist space’ have 
yet to be charted. If, like most transnational formations of the Cold War, 
Eurocommunism was characterised by both ‘promise and fragility’,45 
its promise has been systematically undervalued in the scholarship in 
light of its obvious fragilities. The recent detailed reconstructions of 
Eurocommunists’ failures are no doubt a key step forward in under-
standing the phenomenon and the Cold War framework it was pitted 
against. Yet, without a fundamental reassessment of ‘Eurocommunist 
space’ the fresh scholarly interest on the topic risks remaining walled-
off by the inherent biases of the ‘Cold War lens’. A reassessment of the 
fundamental coordinates of Eurocommunism is thus a prerequisite for 
an appraisal of its impact and legacy beyond 1970s West Europe.
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Coordinates for a new definition of Eurocommunism 
Opening the map of Eurocommunism creates, however, a host of issues 
regarding the definition of the phenomenon. No longer tethered to 
the ‘West’, the analytical perspective tends either to retreat to the indi-
vidual national cases of Eurocommunism or, conversely, to grasp for a 
programmatic feature that would unite Eurocommunists everywhere, 
dissolving the phenomenon’s specificity altogether. The latest literature 
on Eurocommunism has struggled with these limitations, as this section 
will show, but a number of contributions point the way to a revised 
definition able to work around them. Based on the latter, I will make 
the argument that, beyond a transnational formation emerging from 
the coordination of West European CPs, Eurocommunism was a) the 
product of a specific political tradition - the ‘Italian road to socialism’ 
- that went global starting in 1956; b) that it was, in essence, a strategy 
of transition for the crisis world of the 1970s; and c) that, as such, it 
aimed to coalesce a broad spectrum of revolutionary subjects alongside 
the working-class.
This ‘updated’ definition draws from attempts in the latest literature 
to convert Eurocommunism from label to a useful analytical category of 
historical research. The framing of space, as indicated in previous items, 
plays a decisive role and is a clear point of contention in these efforts. 
Nikolas Dörr, for instance, finds the transnational dimension of the 
phenomenon too diffuse to underscore consistent historical analysis. He 
correctly points out that, ‘while the fascination with Eurocommunism 
might have been highly transnational, its unfolding took place mostly on 
a national basis’. With this premise in mind and after stressing the diver-
sity of its national variants, Dörr chooses to frame his research subject 
as a ‘specifically Italian Eurocommunism’.46 If, however, there were as 
many forms of Eurocommunism as there were nationally distinct adher-
ents to it, the question emerges as to what differentiated, for instance, 
‘Italian Eurocommunism’ from Italian communism tout court. Finally, 
this solution only effectively applies to the PCI, in that it was the only 
representative of the coordinated West European CPs whose peculiar 
tradition had a direct connection with the  Eurocommunist formula, 
for instance, in Togliatti’s call for the conversion of the communist 
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movement into a ‘polycentric system’.47 Conversely, it makes little sense 
to speak of a specifically French or Spanish Eurocommunism. The PCF 
and PCE each faced a domestic political reality with a different dynamic 
and, for various reasons, gave Eurocommunism a peculiar inflection, 
but that should not in itself inhibit the use of an umbrella term. 
A better solution seems, instead, to characterise Eurocommunism 
as a transnational formation. Although the precise role of each CP 
and the degree of collaboration and exchanges between them is still 
an open research question, a transnational framing makes it possible, 
for instance, to ascertain a central Italian contribution to the origin 
and makeup of Eurocommunism without necessarily restricting the 
scope of the analysis to the Italian context. While a retreat to the 
national might provide firmer footing in terms of the sources, what sets 
Eurocommunism apart is precisely the heightened coordination and 
collaboration between West European CPs that it involved. The PCI 
openly framed its role in these efforts as part of a ‘new internationalism’, 
considering it went beyond previous cross-border bonds and took place 
in relative autonomy from Moscow.48 The explicit goal of this brand 
of communist internationalism was, however, to disseminate a specific 
programme (the ‘peaceful road’ to socialism) for a specific time (the 
crisis-ridden 1970s). To be clear, I employ the notion of ‘transnational 
formation’ to characterise Eurocommunism from the standpoint of 
historical inquiry, i.e., as an analytical category, therefore setting it apart 
from ‘internationalism’ or ‘internationalist coordination’, which is how 
CPs themselves termed their cross-border political strategy. 
Yet, how can the call for a transnational framing of Eurocommunism 
accommodate the central role of Italian communists in the phenom-
enon? Several recent contributions indicate that the blueprint for the 
Eurocommunist formula originated from the cross-border or interna-
tionalist activities of the PCI on a much broader scale in the 1950s and 
1960s. What emerged was a strategy of transition based on leveraging 
democracy as a tool of social change that was liable to be appropri-
ated in various contexts. Finally, because it spoke to a conjuncture of 
crisis that was global in scale and to a set of emerging political actors 
that were not only present in West Europe, its impact goes beyond the 
final (and short-lived) uptick in electoral success and social prestige for 
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European communism in the 1970s. Only a revised definition can make 
this visible; below are a few promising pathways in scholarship pointing 
towards one.
a) The ‘Italian road to socialism’ and the Third World
If the decisive contribution of Italian communists to Eurocommunism is 
one of the few points of consensus in the literature, what are the roots of 
this leading role and what elements can they provide for a new definition 
of the phenomenon? Studies on the cross-border activities of the PCI 
in the lead-up to Eurocommunism point to how Italian communists 
had become key international players even before its emergence. In fact, 
the prelude to Eurocommunism coincides with what could be termed 
the globalisation of the ‘Italian road to socialism’, i.e., with how, after the 
crisis year of 1956, Italian communists rose to become global actors by 
converting the PCI’s program of a ‘peaceful and democratic road to 
socialism’ into a replicable revolutionary model they could export.
While scholarship has emphasised the better-known cases of 
China49 and Cuba,50 a growing number of studies indicate that the 
PCI also attempted to fashion their own peculiar ‘road to socialism’ 
into a viable blueprint for Third World revolutions. In a postwar 
situation with several incumbents aiming to recapture the ‘charisma 
of world revolution’51– an erstwhile central component of Bolshevik 
power that, by 1956, had been all but abandoned in favour of Soviet 
raison d’ état52 – the last Togliatti displayed a keen awareness for the 
growing centrality of the Third World to global politics.53 Concluding 
that Moscow was not doing enough to provide an alternative model 
for social change in the Third World in light of the challenge of the 
Chinese,54 the PCI ‘pivots’ South, projecting its prestige and tradition 
on the global stage from Africa55 to Latin America,56 in the name of 
the ‘peaceful road to socialism’.57 It is also within this framework that 
the PCI links up with the Non-Aligned Movement and, especially, 
Yugoslavia.58
It seems these developments created two preconditions for the PCI’s 
subsequent leading role in Eurocommunism: a global protagonism that 
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did not strictly orbit the Soviet Union and the party’s identification with 
a project of peaceful – or non-insurrectional – transition to socialism. 
These were, naturally, not the only preconditions for the Italian role in 
the coordination of West European CPs; the prestige drawn from the 
PCI’s participation in the anti-fascist resistance and in the subsequent 
construction of the Italian republic, its mass character and, finally, 
its association with the person and (a certain reading of) the work of 
Antonio Gramsci were all instrumental in lending credibility to its 
programme of fundamental, yet gradual, social change, whose main 
lever was expanding democracy. 
Yet, only a consideration of the PCI’s significant global engagement 
can explain why, for instance, a founding document of this programme 
– and of Eurocommunism itself – is an article about Chile. Enrico 
Berlinguer’s Considerations on Italy after the coup in Chile shows just to 
what extent global context and domestic politics were intertwined in the 
thought-world of the PCI of the 1970s. The case of Italian communists’ 
bond with Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity government in Chile is the 
clearest example of a relationship with a Third World actor that was 
based on solidarity and support but was not limited to a one-way affair. 
As Berlinguer’s reaction to the September 1973 coup demonstrates, it 
also involved a strong component of identification:
The events in Chile were experienced… as a tragedy by millions of 
people spread across all continents. It was and will continue to be 
regarded as an occurrence of global significance, which not only 
elicits feelings of revulsion […] and of solidarity with those that 
fell victim to it and resist it, but also raises questions that compel 
all those that struggle for democracy in every country to reflect.59 
The events in Chile were perceived not only as the catastrophic defeat of 
an ally in a context far-removed from West Europe, but as a direct blow 
to Italian communists’ own political project. It is in this series of articles 
that Berlinguer first articulated the ‘historic compromise’, i.e., the will-
ingness to forge an alliance with Christian Democrats both to safeguard 
Italian democracy and as a step towards a broad popular coalition for 
social progress ‘on the road to socialism’. While the coup in Chile did 
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not cause the PCI’s change of course, it is nevertheless striking that an 
event across the Atlantic provides the occasion to announce it. The rela-
tionship between the PCI and Chilean politics is indeed a complex case 
of transnational entanglement.60 It went further than the status of the 
Chilean Popular Unity experiment (1970-1973) as a living model for the 
‘peaceful road to socialism’ championed by the PCI; Chilean commu-
nists had been actively supported by their Italian comrades since the late 
1950s and especially through the 1960s, i.e., long before they came to 
power alongside the socialist Salvador Allende in 1970.61 The connec-
tion with Chile is, rather, evidence of a much broader reorientation of 
Italian communism than the Eurocommunist formula is conventionally 
thought to imply:
The depth of the bond uniting the party of Botteghe Oscure and 
the Chilean experiment can only be understood if one takes into 
account how the latter overlapped and combined with a number 
of other phenomena which had enormous repercussions on the 
identity of the PCI… they broke open the elementary coordinates 
of a thought-world centered on the combination of working class 
and Soviet Union, which had characterised their utopia until the 
1950s.62 
In a way, then, to become a central player in European communism, the 
PCI had first to overcome its ‘traditional eurocentrism’.63 It is thus the 
destruction of Chilean democracy that, paradoxically, signals the need 
to shift the focus of international activities towards a West European 
setting perceived to be in line for a similar fate, thus sparking the 
Eurocommunism coordination. This assessment does not invalidate 
attempts in the recent scholarship to frame Eurocommunism as a form 
of communist ‘Europeanism’ i.e., as part of the broader effort at forging 
Europe into an autonomous player in the global arena that found adher-
ents across the political spectrum at that juncture. Eurocommunism 
did coincide with a shift in Italian communists’ stance towards 
European integration, from ‘opposition to euphoria’.64  Eurocommunist 
Europeanism was, however, interwoven with a strong element of 
Third-Worldism65 and aimed to ‘redefine the terms of North-South rela-
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tions’.66 This helps explain why ‘there is scarcely a solemn occasion in 
the life of the party’ in which Enrico Berlinguer ‘did not take a stance 
on the fortunes of the Third World and the newly-independent coun-
tries’.67 Silvio Pons termed this the ‘universalist mission’ inherent to the 
‘Eurocommunist formula’.68 A universalism that encompassed both the 
efforts to globalise the ‘Italian road to socialism’, but also a keen aware-
ness, as articulated by Berlinguer, of the ‘liberating and stimulating 
effects that can derive - indeed have already derived - from emancipatory 
processes of the Third World’ for the European context – a remark made 
in reference to the roots of the Carnation Revolution in anti-colonial 
struggles in Africa.69 
As a final note, it is worth mentioning that long before scholarship 
drew attention to what I have termed the globalisation of the ‘Italian 
road to socialism’, i.e., the augmentation of the cross-border relevance 
of the Italian communist tradition in West Europe and beyond, it was 
recognised in its broad outlines by an enthusiastic Third-World adherent 
of Eurocommunism. In a 1979 essay titled ‘Democracy as a universal 
value’, Carlos Nelson Coutinho, an intellectual of the Brazilian 
Communist Party [PCB] that had spent part of his exile in Italy in 
the late 1970s, drew a novel interpretation of Berlinguer’s epithet from 
his Moscow speech. Coutinho believed it to be valid not only in West 
Europe, but also across the Atlantic:
This universality should not be conceived in a merely theoretical 
sense; nor is the value of democracy limited to certain geographical 
contexts. For if there is a universal element in the theoretical reflec-
tions and political praxis of what is today called Eurocommunism, 
it is precisely the new way… it conceives the relationship between 
socialism and democracy.70 
Within the context of Brazil’s transition to democracy in the 1980s, 
the essay has been called a ‘true watershed for the Brazilian left’.71 As I 
stressed above, similarly to the case of Spain, Brazilian communists saw 
Eurocommunism as a formula to convert the transition to democracy in 
a country still ruled by a dictatorship into the first step on the pathway 
to socialism. The next item approaches what lent credence to this possi-
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bility – thus putting wind in Eurocommunism’s sails – in a variety of 
contexts in the 1970s.
b) The ‘shock of the global’ and the search for a ‘third way’ in the 
1970s
If Eurocommunism is a strategy of transition rooted in the Italian 
communist tradition and stemming from the coordination of West 
European CPs (but applicable beyond Europe), it is indissociable from 
a specific global moment marked by multiple crises in which such a 
transition was regarded as a real possibility. In addition to the mostly 
overlooked peak ‘impact of the Third World on Western Europe’,72 
Eurocommunism was the product of a scenario of economic crisis in 
the 1970s which signalled in the eyes of its proponents an open avenue 
for programs of socialist transition. The antediluvian character of this 
horizon of possibility – which did not close as much as slam shut in the 
1980s – likely explains the difficulty for historical narrative today to 
restore it as a key driver of Eurocommunism.
Part of the reason is, once more, the tendency to frame the role of 
global processes strictly from the standpoint of its national ramifica-
tions. Thus, even those studies that point to the global economic crisis 
of the 1970s as a key contextual element for Eurocommunism have 
downplayed the weight of cross-border factors in its trajectory. Basosi 
and Bernardini, for instance, have pointed out how ‘Eurocommunism’s 
steep parabola simply paralleled the rise and fall of the PCI’s electoral 
performance’, which they ascribe to:
positions actually taken by its leadership in the Italian context 
during the crucial period 1976–78, rather than to philosophical 
disputes about the possibility of finding the desired ‘third way’ 
between Soviet communism and Western European social 
democracy.73 
Yet, are missteps in the domestic arena and the failure to forge a ‘third 
way’ necessarily self-excluding causes for the decline of Eurocommunism? 
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Basosi and Bernardini themselves stress how the new context created by 
the global economic downturn of the 1970s played a decisive role in the 
Italian conjuncture and how it was ultimately the failure of the PCI to 
provide a consistent alternative to the crisis that led to its subsequent 
decline in popularity74. The search for a ‘third way’ by West European 
communists was, in fact, intrinsically linked to the crisis, which both 
raised the question of power anew and cut through the various national 
contexts where ‘reform communism’ played a relevant role. 
The significance of the crisis was noted at the time both by actors 
and observers of Eurocommunism. In December of 1974, Berlinguer 
termed it a ‘deep crisis of a new type’, one that went beyond ‘cyclical 
crises’ as it ‘affects all areas - the economy, politics, culture - and 
manifests itself both internally in each country and in international 
relations’.75 Fernando Claudín, in turn, drew attention to how the 
global crisis of capitalism was ‘acting as a great orchestra conductor’ 
by synchronising the distinct social and political processes affecting 
the three core Eurocommunist countries as well as elevating the 
degree of influence they could exert on one another.76 Furthermore, 
as one recent analyst has pointed out, ‘in Italy, Spain and France, the 
profound social and economic crisis coincided with the crisis of their 
respective political systems’.77 In fact, despite their differences, both 
the Italian Republic and the French Fifth Republic saw major shifts 
in their respective party landscapes at the time; Spain, in turn, saw 
the onset of its transition to democracy. Crucially, West European 
communists and other left-wing forces felt poised to take the political 
initiative within this context. In the words of PCE historians Carme 
Molinero and Pere Ysàs: 
The pathway to a democratic socialism seemed open by a combi-
nation of the capitalist crisis, the strength of the labor and popular 
movements and of left-wing parties as well as the vitality of demo-
cratic institutions.78
Silvio Pons has similarly drawn attention to Berlinguer’s relatively opti-
mistic assessment of the turbulent global conjuncture of the 1970s; while 
the leader of the PCI did not rule out an authoritarian shift in Europe as 
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a response to the crisis, he ultimately believed it also offered a window 
of opportunity:
At his confidential meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, the general 
secretary of the CPSU, on March 1 [1976], Berlinguer emphasised 
the ‘new possibilities’ arising from the ‘democratic and socialist 
forces’ in a situation marked, in his opinion, by the decline of the 
United States after its defeat in Vietnam and by the crisis of capi-
talism in Western Europe.79
For a time, the mounting crisis of capitalism and the growing electoral 
success of the PCI ‘seemed to lend weight to Berlinguer’s strategy’.80 The 
protagonists of Eurocommunism had indeed accurately sensed there was 
an epochal shift in progress; they, however, fatally misjudged its general 
tendency. What the crisis context of the mid-1970s gave rise to was not 
democratic socialism, but neoliberalism.81 In fact, Eurocommunism and 
neoliberalism turn out to be radically opposite solutions to the same 
crisis scenario; where the former failed, the latter took hold. 
Eurocommunists did not factor in such an outcome as possible in 
their political calculations; they believed a conservative alternative to their 
program would be more akin to the coup in Chile in 1973, i.e., would 
very likely mean the destruction of democracy (or, in the case of Spain, 
the failure to overcome dictatorship). That a sustained attack on welfare 
systems and a surge in the concentration of wealth and income at the top of 
the social pyramid would be possible without doing away with the demo-
cratic institutional order on the national level is something that would start 
to become evident only by the end of the decade, as neoliberalism gained 
consistency as a platform and reaped electoral victories in major contests. 
This failure of foresight explains a range of fateful miscalculations. 
As the question of a loan to Italy emerged during the Andreotti govern-
ment in 1976, PCI leadership chose to garner credibility in the eyes of 
domestic elites and US authorities through an ‘acquiescent attitude on 
the IMF clauses’, as opposed to addressing those ‘demands for social 
justice that had been at the root of its earlier success’.82 It is in this 
context that Berlinguer comes out in favor of austerity, attempting to 
give it a left-wing, vaguely anti-capitalist connotation.83 
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Thus, with the post-war order social democracy had helped forge 
in disarray and the USSR less and less a beacon of hope to CPs 
increasingly critical of it, finding a ‘third way’ was anything but a philo-
sophical dispute. The attempt to trail it, nevertheless, only makes sense 
against the background of the general crisis of the 1970s, which gives 
Eurocommunism its specific historical time; one framed, respectively, 
by the aftermath of the global 1968 and the beginning of the fall of 
communism in 1989. 
Setting Eurocommunism within a clearly defined historical frame is 
an important steppingstone towards a new definition. For, if a retreat 
to the national variants of Eurocommunism can result in losing sight of 
its key transnational dimension and global context, the attempt to sever 
the definition from a concrete space-time, is even more of an analytical 
dead-end. An example pertains to the centrality of democracy, both as 
a means for the transition to socialism and as its desired political form. 
While it certainly unites Eurocommunists across national contexts, if 
taken in isolation, it makes the West European CPs of the 1970s indis-
tinguishable from the pre-1914 SPD’s revisionist wing, Austro-marxists, 
popular-front communists and any other attempt to leverage democracy 
as a pathway to and – in its ‘fully-fledged’ form – as the embodiment of 
socialism, all the way to present-day Spain’s Podemos.84
A similar issue emerges when distancing or disobedience towards 
Moscow is the yardstick in question. Once again, while greater 
autonomy and the willingness to subject Soviet policy or its model of 
socialism to critique were traits that united all Eurocommunists, not 
only did Western European CPs distance themselves to different degrees 
from the USSR – from timid and hesitant disagreement (PCF), to 
consistent critique though not to the point of a break (PCI), all the way 
to bordering on full rupture (PCE) –, they were not the only dissenting 
voices in the international communist movement. In the European 
context, this trait extended, for instance, to the Yugoslav Communist 
League and the Romanian ruling CP under Ceauşescu. As mentioned 
above, Yugoslavia’s connection to Eurocommunism is a relevant one 
due to the role played by the rebel socialist state in challenging the 
bipolar framework. The case of Romania, which directly supported 
Eurocommunist parties,85 shows, however, that isolated criteria such 
20th Century Communism 17.indd   47 05/11/2019   15:17:45
Twentieth Century Communism – Issue 17
48 Victor Strazzeri
as ‘autonomy from the USSR’ can lead to radically inconsistent ascrip-
tions.86 The solution I suggested above, i.e., defining Eurocommunism 
as a strategy of transition, rules out the inclusion of ruling parties in 
socialist states within the scope of the phenomenon. Yet, the concep-
tualisation of Eurocommunism must also be able to account for the 
influence and impact of actors and events in the socialist world in its 
trajectory. 
The most consistent effort in this regard in the recent literature was 
made by Pons and Di Donato, who frame Eurocommunism as a chapter 
of ‘reform communism’ understood in the broad sense, i.e., as a link 
between the Prague Spring of the late 1960s and perestroika in the late-
1980s USSR.87 This view emphasises Eurocommunism’s transnational 
entanglements with the East, linking the phenomenon with critical 
stances on Soviet communism from within the ‘iron curtain’.88 This 
framing raises fertile research questions, especially regarding the possible 
impact of Eurocommunism as inspiration for the Gorbachev-led efforts 
at reform of the USSR.89 
This assessment also neatly closes the circle of transfers and 
exchanges between the West European CPs, on the one hand, and 
the reform attempts in the European socialist states that set off from 
1956 and reach a high point in 1968, on the other. As a number of 
studies have shown, the majority of the West European CPs openly 
manifested their disagreement with the intervention of Warsaw Pact 
forces in Czechoslovakia90 and, while this rang louder in the case of the 
Italian and Spanish CPs,91 it did not exclude the more closely aligned 
PCF. According to the research, the ascent and repression of the Prague 
Spring contributed to the later emergence of “Eurocommunism” in 
two ways: it catalysed the tendencies for autonomous action that were 
already present for some time within many CPs of West Europe and 
beyond and, secondly, it spurred an immediate call for more cooperation 
between them, with the PCI in the lead.92 
Yet, what the latest studies on the impact of the events of 1968 in 
Prague on West European CPs have also established is the fact that 
the connection between the critical stance these parties took on in the 
aftermath of the intervention and their later turn to Eurocommunism 
was not a direct or straightforward one.93 As Maud Bracke has stressed, 
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besides the fact that ‘the links between the two events are taken for 
granted or are not specified’, the direct link thesis fails to explain the 
gap represented by the extended ‘phase of realignment initiated in late 
1968 up to the early 1970s’.94 
In this sense, though the impact of the Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia was no doubt a key moment in the pathway to 
Eurocommunism,95 other key occurrences from the same period, espe-
cially the French ‘68 and Italian ‘hot autumn’ of 1969, must be added 
to the narrative, even if the PCF and PCI were not – at least initially – 
relevant players in either case.96 The eruptions of the global ‘68 hit close 
to home and, indeed, led to significant aftershocks in the major West 
European CPs, which were no less challenged by these events than the 
postwar status quo sixty-eighters aimed to radically transform.
c) Eurocommunists and the aftermath of 1968
Taking stock of the recent literature on the global 1968, Odd Arne 
Westad drew the somewhat surprising conclusion that ‘the biggest 
political change of the time’ was actually ‘the reorientation of the largest 
Western European communist parties toward democratic participation 
and parliamentary strategies’.97 Yet, Westad argues, much of the New 
Left that emerged from the 1960s did not engage with the phenom-
enon, because they ‘found it easier to idealise far-away rebel groups 
than to work with the traditional Left of their own countries’. In fact, 
the only forces emerging from the 1960s rebellion that were able ‘to 
overcome political and social divisions and thereby lay the foundation 
for long-term change’ were ‘the women’s movement and the civil rights 
movement in the United States’.98 
While Westad is correct to point out the fundamental gap separating 
New Left organisations and movements from the more ‘traditional’ 
left-wing forces they aimed to overcome, a closer look at the interac-
tions of  Eurocommunist CPs and the ‘new social movements’ shows a 
more complex and entangled relationship. Especially in the case of one 
of Westad’s few enduring offshoots of 1968, the women’s movement, 
research has begun to uncover not only active cooperation, but an at 
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times intense – if far from harmonious – overlap with reform commu-
nism, even if a lasting synthesis ultimately failed to materialise. 
Once again, it is the limited scope of the conventional defini-
tion of Eurocommunism – alongside the deep-seated notion that, 
as supposedly antagonistic phenomena, the communist movement 
and ‘new social movements’ are topics for different experts, if not 
disciplines – that has prevented more studies into its gender dimen-
sion and impaired the reception of those efforts that have tackled 
the issue. As in the previous items, my goal here is not to refute 
prevailing definitions of Eurocommunism, but rather to widen their 
scope and sharpen their focus through a brief reconsideration of the 
latest research. 
Eurocommunism has, for instance, often been defined by the 
expanded alliance policy its protagonists engaged in. Taken in isolation, 
this trait again makes the phenomenon indistinguishable, for instance, 
from the popular-front politics of the 1930s; on the other hand, an 
overly narrow understanding of these novel alliances sees the three 
main Eurocommunist CPs attempting to converge with a different set 
of forces in each case – Christian Democrats in Italy, socialists in France 
and forging a broad democratic front in Spain. By adjusting the notion of 
expanded alliances to encompass other political and social subjects beyond 
the working class, as opposed to relating it strictly to political parties 
beyond the communist tradition, not only does Eurocommunism’s 
gender dimension and interactions with a resurgent feminist movement 
enter the picture, this recalibration further contributes to situating the 
phenomenon historically, considering the 1970s were also the decade of 
a global feminist upsurge. 
This is not an entirely new angle on the topic. A few dissenting voices 
in the scholarship had indeed previously suggested that the relationship 
between Eurocommunism and ‘new s ocial movements’ was a relevant 
one and merited further study; Geoff Eley, for instance, stressed in 
the early 2000s that, in addition to ‘breaking with the USSR’ and 
embracing ‘pluralism [and] multiparty competition’, 
Eurocommunists prioritised issues that couldn’t be subsumed 
within class-struggle perspectives based on the working class. […] 
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These departures converged with the legacies of 1968, for which 
Eurocommunism became a main conduit to the party system.99
This understanding of Eurocommunism is significant not only because 
it radically breaks with the Cold War top-down framing of the phenom-
enon, but because of its implications with regards to a much broader 
issue: it might uncover an instance where the gulf conventionally 
thought to separate a ‘politics of class’ and a ‘politics of gender’ was 
demonstrably bridged. 
The Italian case is a particularly fertile testing ground for this hypoth-
esis. 100 As Maud Bracke has stressed, despite being known as the ‘years 
of lead’, 1970s Italy actually saw ‘high-levels of social participation’, 
peaking precisely in the ‘campaigns around divorce and abortion’.101 
The PCI was not only active in both campaigns it was the most impor-
tant force within the party spectrum to campaign for a ‘no’ vote in the 
divorce referendum of 1974102 and to push for the approval of legislation 
legalising abortion, culminating in the passing of Law 194 of 1978.103
Yet, because the importance of the women’s movement to this period 
has not been adequately reflected in historiography, the question of its 
overlap with Eurocommunism has barely been raised. In the Italian 
case, the dynamic behind the formation of this blind spot is clear. 
According to Bracke, ‘…political histories of 1970s Italy… have gener-
ally been unable to grasp the central role played by women and feminism 
in the dramatic transformation of Italian society and politics in this 
period’.104 Crucially, this transformative role also extends to communist 
politics, as visible in the transition of the PCI-aligned women’s organi-
sation, the Unione Donne Italiane (UDI), to a much more autonomous 
and combative stance over the course of the 1970s, when it incorporated 
many perspectives from contemporary feminist groups.105 Galvanised 
by the transformations in the UDI and the aforementioned campaigns, 
the PCI’s female members increasingly demanded a larger role in the 
party, compelling it to give greater attention to the ‘women’s question’, 
even if further research is needed to ascertain just how far it went in this 
direction.106
As for Eurocommunism, leading female activists of the PCI under-
stood the growing centrality of feminist issues to party debate and policy 
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as an integral part of the change of culture it embodied; they were also 
quick to recognise that this dimension of the  Eurocommunist turn 
would likely be downplayed or outright ignored in mainstream debate. 
In the preface to a still very readable and revealing volume of interviews 
with female activists of the PCI published in mid-1979, Laura Lilli gives 
a novel interpretation of the  Eurocommunist notion of a ‘third way’. 
Lilli argued the term also expressed the pathway communist women 
took to address the issue of ‘double militancy’, i.e., the possibility of 
simultaneous activism in the PCI and feminist groups (double militancy 
had always been taboo in communist politics). By securing the consent 
of the party to be active in both the institutional and extra-parliamen-
tary left, communist women had introduced ‘a further, original Italian 
attempt at a “third way”’, one that was, ‘of course, systematically disre-
garded by “political scientists”.’107 The advent of ‘double militancy’, Lilli 
concluded, indicated that the Eurocommunist third way was not limited 
to the ‘ideological, economic or diplomatic’ spheres; ‘nor did it regard 
only great power “structures” and policy’;108 it also pertained to ‘the 
everyday dimension of our existence’.109 
Feminism had revealed that the experience of hardship and oppres-
sion women experienced in everyday life was every bit as political as 
the causes around which both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ left were organised. 
‘Feminism is thus as political as all the anti-authoritarian movements 
underway in the world today’, argued Carla Ravaioli, in the preface to 
another interview volume, this one pitting the PCI’s (male) leaders, from 
Napolitano to Berlinguer, with the ‘women’s question’.110 For many 
women in 1970s Italy, this assessment did not mean turning away from 
the communist party; rather – and no doubt as a result of the promise 
of renewal represented by Eurocommunism –, many entered the PCI 
precisely in this juncture, often after disappointing experiences with 
the patriarchal nature of the small leftist groupings that emerged in the 
context of the 1968 moment.
These developments characterise what Maud Bracke termed the 
‘process of post-1968 re-institutionalisation’, whereby there was a 
‘transfer of political agency by social movements to the political parties 
and state institutions which they had previously contested, specifically 
the PCI’.111
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What drove this process was an understanding of feminism as 
part of the general ‘assault on the vertical and class-based structure of 
society’, in the words of Ravaioli; despite conceding that the ‘primary 
and politically “proper” expressions’ of this assault were ‘class struggle’ 
and ‘Third-Worldist insurrection’ and that every distinct movement 
was a manifestation of subjects ‘with specific problems, demanding 
specific analyses and tactical choices’, Ravaioli maintained they were 
‘all recognisable as a kind of “plural subject”, in one and the same 
struggle against capitalism and the ideology that sustains it’.112 This 
unifying viewpoint constituted an attempt to express conceptually, 
what was a growing articulation between communist militancy, new 
social movements and wider global trends in 1970s Italy. Especially 
for women activists, this synthesis was what Eurocommunism was 
primarily about, something the scholarship has failed so far to appraise 
systematically. 
In her 1979 review of Lili and Valentini’s interview volume, Rossana 
Rossanda – a member of the PCI until she was expelled alongside the Il 
Manifesto group in 1969 – shows this understanding of Eurocommunism 
was not exclusive to its membership. Rossanda remarked how the inter-
views ‘suddenly made plain the decade of distance separating her time 
in the party’ and how they brought home just ‘how the fabric of the 
PCI had changed in the 1970s’. As a party dissident, Rossanda was not 
one to spare the PCI of critique, but perhaps for this very reason she 
was able to devise the true content of the process of renewal heralded 
by Eurocommunism, doing so against the common wisdom – then 
and now – on this matter. ‘These changes’, she remarked, ‘were not 
explainable with the overcoming of the ambivalences from Togliatti to 
Berlinguer’, rather, they resulted from 
the overlapping of the political shift of the historic compromise 
and the mass movement, from which the PCI extracted its 
political capital between 1968 and 1975; a movement which, 
having shattered itself on the cliffs of the New Left, but still full 
of impetuousness, found its way to the party bestowing it with 
antagonistic and radical traits.113 
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Conclusion
The goal of this article has been to produce a review of the latest litera-
ture on Eurocommunism that compiles the main results achieved but 
does so ‘against the grain’ – i.e., providing a critical examination of some 
of the chief trends in how the phenomenon has been framed. This effort 
has led to the suggestion of a few key coordinates for a renewed defini-
tion of Eurocommunism. Fundamental to it is the notion that most 
current takes on the phenomenon need an urgent ‘de-centring’, that 
is, a framing that considers the global context of the Eurocommunist 
formula beyond a strict view of bipolar rivalry, thus incorporating the 
key role of the Third World into the analysis and taking into account 
actors not usually considered relevant to communist politics. 
This call to ‘provincialise’ Eurocommunism is no doubt inspired by 
current debates in historiography and society at large but is no less a way 
to reconnect with the way actors themselves engaged with the phenom-
enon in the 1970s. Thus, while it might seem self-evident to emphasise 
the role of the bipolar system in the trajectory of a phenomenon such 
as Eurocommunism, with insights from postcolonial and feminist 
perspectives a seemingly anachronistic projection of current issues and 
analytical trends, the argument I want to close this literature review with 
is that precisely the opposite is the case. Without downplaying the role 
of the superpowers in containing and limiting the possibilities of success 
of the Eurocommunist CPs, it is the ‘Cold War lens’ and the associated 
notion of a self-encapsulated ‘West’ that upon closer examination emerge 
as the actual projections of contemporary analysts onto their source 
material, resulting in an overly narrow picture of Eurocommunism as 
a historical phenomenon. On the other hand, a provincialised view of 
Eurocommunism that emphasises the role of transfers and connections 
with the Third World appears to be more consistent with the way its 
own purveyors and supporters saw the world, even if this might seem 
counterintuitive today; gender, in turn, equally emerges as an entirely 
neglected driver of Eurocommunism, once the overlap between the 
communist and feminist movements are at all considered by scholarship.
This hypothesis – raised here in a necessarily shorthand form – is an 
effort to further stimulate the debate on Eurocommunism, one dating 
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from the very emergence of the phenomenon; a decade of resurgent 
scholarship on the topic and a steady stream of publications that shows 
no signs of tapering off, has prepared the ground for exciting open 
avenues of research, some of which this essay touched upon, but of 
which there are surely many more. 114
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